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Summary 
Cyberspace is an intrinsic part of the development of any country. A 
strong cyber capacity is crucial for states to progress and develop in 
economic, political and social spheres.1 The need to integrate cyber 
capacity building and development policies has been documented by 
both the cyber community, academia and policy makers. The invest-
ment in securing cyberspace affects the success rate of other policy 
initiatives as well. However, there is a clear need for a deeper dialogue 
with the development community and recipient countries in order to 
better understand how to implement cyber capacities in practice in 
order to achieve broader development goals. To stimulate the debate on 
cyber capacity building and its impact on social and economic develop-
ment worldwide this brief puts forward challenges to implementation. 
The aim is to set priorities and identify indicators of success and 
failure. To steer this process a better overview of initiatives and avoid 
duplication, it is necessary to set up the challenges that both the 
donors and recipients face. By doing this we move cyber capacity 
building one step closer to successful implementation. 
 
                                                             
1  Pawlak, P. (ed.), Riding the digital wave: The impact of cyber capacity building on 
human development, ISSUE, report nr 21.  
Introduction 
Cyberspace is growing at a speed unprecedented by any other commod-
ity. Almost three billion people are now connected to the Internet 
through cyberspace; a figure growing rapidly and estimated to reach 
five billion people, using 50 billion devices, by 2020 (Evans, 2011). As 
most of this growth will take place in emerging economies, it is not sur-
prising that the development community is pondering how to better 
leverage the benefits accruing from the use of cyberspace and Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies (ICT) through cyber-capacity 
building (CCB).2 This exercise, however, will prove futile unless backed 
up by serious discussion about the need to address the challenges 
posed by the proliferation of ICT infrastructure and Internet appli-
cations for sustainable development in the implementation of CCB. 
Cyberspace is a new environment where no country is immune to 
the threats that its use entails. With rapid growth come possibilities in 
development and new ways to empower people: however, this is 
accompanied by new vulnerabilities, risks and challenges. It is there-
fore crucial to research how to build cyber-capacities in developing 
countries and simultaneously how to secure these. Cyberspace and CCB 
rapid development has resulted in that the literature of and the 
developments in CCB are sporadic and disordered in nature, which 
makes keeping up with progress in the field a challenge. This report 
sets out to collect and assess some of the work conducted to date, and 
examines its feasibility and applicability. Next, we build on the ana-
lysis of this work and give an assessment of what can be built upon for 
successful implementation. Thirdly we map out some of the general 
challenges facing CCB on the donor as well as the recipient end. It is 
important to chart these: if the challenges can be quantified, then 
solutions to bring CCB forward can be proposed. Given the rapid pace 
of technological progress, capacity building must be recognized as a 
dynamic process where the needs of stakeholders are constantly 
evolving. Nevertheless CCB is essential; a firm and targeted approach is 
called for. It is of paramount importance to invest in securing cyber-
space, as this affects the success rate of other policy initiatives. This 
report takes a step towards implementation of CCB by specifying the 
challenges for the road ahead. 
                                                             
2  The importance of ICT for development was acknowledged at the World Summits on the 
Information Society that took place in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005). Further, the UN has 
recognized ICT connectivity as an increasingly important facet of social and economic 
development. In particular, the 2009 Report of the Millennium Development Goals Gap Task 
Force reflected on the persistence of the ‘digital divide’ between developed and developing 
countries and on the need to bridge this gap. There has come a recognition of the diffusion of 
new technologies that open new possibilities of empowerment for the poor by providing them 
with access to services otherwise difficult to access, such as banking and health information.  
Cybercapacity building in 
developing countries 
The rapid growth of and global access to ICT, combined with economic 
growth, has resulted in a great many first-time users in developing 
countries. Indeed, the fastest growth in Internet users today is in deve-
loping countries – in Asia and Africa in particular (ITU, 2014). Cyber-
space is an intrinsic part of the development of any country. A strong 
cyber capacity is crucial for states to progress and develop in the econo-
mic, political and social spheres. It is therefore essential to mainstream 
CCB into development programs so that countries can get the 
assistance they need to improve and secure their development and 
growth (ISSEU, 2013; UNDESA, 2011, UNIDIR, 2013).  
To build a stable and solid cyber capacity the capacities built to 
utilize cyberspace need to be secured. Cybersecurity in this report is 
defined as the response to threats to a well-functioning cyberspace 
through the empowerment of individuals, communities and govern-
ments.3 This is crucial for achieving a country’s developmental goals, 
as it reduces the digital security risks stemming from access to and use 
of cyberspace.  A This broad view of ‘risks’ is taken in this report to 
include not only those posed by state or non-state actors to another 
state and its citizens (i.e. loss of data, attacks on government websites), 
but also those resulting from a state’s negligence or premeditated 
actions against its own citizens (i.e. surveillance programs, content 
blocking) (Pawlak 2014). Consequently we employ the term CCB 
throughout this report as an umbrella concept for all types of activities 
(e.g human resource development, institutional reform, organizational 
adaptions) and support provided to developing nations to increase 
their access to, and ability to benefit fully from, the internet and other 
elements of cyberspace (ibid., EUISS 2014)  
As cyberspace knows no boundaries, developing countries increas-
ingly face the same cyber threats in cyberspace as the developed world 
does in correlation with their increasing access and use of cyberspace. 
These threats range from malware to cyber-crime, in the form of attacks 
                                                             
3  Such threats can come from various kinds of malware: an attack on different forms 
on the codes that make up cyberspace. When these codes are changed by actors 
other than those who ‘own’ them or have created them, we talk about an  ‘attack’. 
Such attacks may involve spying on, stealing, abusing and destroying digital infor-
mation, in extreme situations creating physical and off-line effects. The different 
ways of altering a code are what separates the different viruses and attacks on 
cyberspace, but the core point is that what is involved is unauthorized change to 
code (Cavelty, 2014). Another form of vulnerability is systemic failures as a result of 
malware, as with blackouts or loss of control of vital control systems. 
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on state infrastructure, vital industry, information technology and 
individuals (UNDOC, 2013; ITU, 2012). As proper network, security 
and legal framework often lacks in developing countries they have 
fewer capabilities for dealing with these challenges than the developed 
world  (IDG connect, 2012). This makes them vulnerable to cybercrime 
and increases the chances of being attacked. Further the countries 
governmental institutional capacity and awareness of the threat is 
often limited. 
Awareness of the extent to which cyberspace vulnerabilities and 
limited capacities prevent countries from maximizing the benefits 
stemming from the use of the Internet has started to emerge slowly in 
some countries, but they often suffer from limited resources or lack of 
experience. Struggling with pressing issues directly linked to social and 
economic development, most developing countries welcome the 
‘digital wave’ as an opportunity, without paying sufficient attention to 
the associated risks (Pawlak 2014). Others show increasing scepticism 
to the measures needed to protect and secure the digital realm, seeing 
them as ‘Western imposition’ on their governance. The result is that 
developing countries are rapidly increasing their access to cyberspace, 
without adequate security measures. This can bring in more damage 
than benefit to both the state and the local economy (Burt et al. 2014a). 
Progress is inseparably linked with IT and technology, but it requires 
the right support apparatus. That is why CCB has become a key 
instrument available to the donor community for ensuring a minimum 
level of cybersecurity across the globe. On paper CCB allows developed 
nations to share the knowledge they have with developing nations on 
cyber capacity. Finding the right way to do this in practice is another 
matter.
Cyber capacity building today 
Support and assistance is provided to developing nations to increase 
their access to, and ability to fully benefit from, the Internet and other 
elements of cyberspace. Many organizations, national and internatio-
nal, are grappling with how to build cyber capacity in developing 
countries. Approaches vary in focus from local, state to regional; from a 
specific area within CCB to all-encompassing. Some assess all levels of 
cyber capacity within a state; others map out the differences in each 
country, while yet others focus on specific aspect of the state, such as 
building a legal framework or Computer emergency response team 
(CERT). The differences in focus result in fragmented coverage of CCB; 
moreover, the size of the field, unreliable data and rapid development 
in cyberspace itself may lead to insufficient approaches and methods. 
Methods to date have not managed to cover CCB as a whole on a global 
scale – or else they argue for CCB, but without indicating how to go 
about implementing it. Some approaches set out a scope that is either 
too broad or too narrow, while others focus on different ways of 
highlighting the problems that come with increased access to 
cyberspace, but without indicating solutions. Nevertheless, some 
trends are emerging in the international CCB policy debate as to how to 
provide developing nations with increased access to, and the ability to 
benefit fully benefit, the Internet and cyberspace more generally. 
Common features here are improved social and economic conditions 
through increased security, legal frameworks or other means; however, 
reports and arguments vary widely on how to achieve these.  
Recent reports have shifted focus from the broad overall scope and 
arguments concerning CCB and argue that CCB programs must be 
firmer and precise to be successful. This entail creating a holistic 
approach, often encompassing five areas of society: the judicial, social, 
economic, governmental and educational sectors. In this way, the 
complexity and encompassing nature of cyberspace is split up, making 
the work and analysis approachable and allowing the objective to be 
explicitly defined.   
With their Cyber Index the UN Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR 2013) take a step towards mapping out the technical/political 
levels of the cyber capabilities of individual countries, organizing all 
countries according to the level and structure of their cyber capacity 
and security. However, countries’ capacities are mapped out individu-
ally in this index, minimizing the ability for comparison. Further, the 
model is not open to adaptability and moulding depending on changes 
and improvements in country capabilities. Once a country has been 
entered in the Index, changes are not included. This limits its 
applicability and the use of the classification in assistance and CCB. 
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Another index that works towards a firm and precise cyber capacity 
analysis is the Cyber Readiness Index 1.0 created at the Belfer Center at 
Harvard University. This index maps 35 countries that have embraced 
ICT and the Internet, and then applies an objective methodology to 
evaluate each country's maturity as to its commitment to cybersecurity 
across five essential elements.4 This work is crucial for CCB; as aiding 
countries through this index can evaluate who they can assist and how. 
Nevertheless the index to date is limited by the number of countries 
included, restricted by the number of countries included in the index.  
To circumvent the restriction of number of countries that a analysis 
can thoroughly examine the  Australian Strategic Policy Institute, with 
its International Cyber Policy Centre Maturity Metric (2014) assesses 
the regional cyber-landscape and evaluates whole-of-government 
policy and legislative structures, military organization, business and 
digital economic strength and levels of cyber-societal awareness in the 
Asia-Pacific  region. Also noteworthy is Cyber Green (2014), recently 
launched by the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team 
network, aimed at establishing an effective hub for collaboration efforts 
to address cyber risks and improve the health of the cyber ecosystem. 
However, both the above-mentioned initiatives are limited by their 
regional focus. Regional assessment is useful, but as cyberspace has no 
boundaries, the issues these countries faces are not always regionally 
defined. A country in another region might have more in common in its 
cyber capacities and challenges it faces with a country in a different 
region than a neighbouring country. Excluding this comparison thus 
restricts the development of CCB. 
Taking a step towards global assessment Microsoft, one of the 
private stakeholders with the most information on cybersecurity, has 
sought to move CCB forward by creating several models and 
classification systems based on their own data. The most recent 
approach, Linking Cybersecurity Policy and Performance (Kleiner et al. 
2014), provides a comparative classification system where various 
levels of the cyber capacity of nations are compared. Acknowledging 
that all countries differ in their capacities, the creators of this model 
also attempt to identify similarities. Based on an assessment of the 
relationship between the prevalence of malware combined with an 
analysis of socioeconomic factors and policy choices, countries are 
sorted into three distinct clusters: maximizers, aspirants and seekers.5 
This allows for assessment of the links between changes in national 
development and cybersecurity over time, as well as a focus on how 
                                                             
4  The successor 2.0 is under development and will include 125 countries in the 
analysis 
5  The work is based on a statistical model that includes 80 social and economic 
policy indicators. Using 34 of these (including GDP/cap, literacy rate, and rule of 
law) it aims to predict a country’s malware  by tracking infection rates of malicious 
software (malware) and then using this as a proxy to measure cybersecurity 
performance (Kleiner et al. 2014). 
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cybersecurity is changing. Tracing malware is a useful and promising 
approach. Equally, the ability to assess developing countries’ malware 
is helpful for analysing the extent and nature of cybercrime in 
developing countries.  
Taking another approach the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), together with 
the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats 
(IMPACT) map cybersecurity levels of their member states through 
organized exercises and ‘cyber-attacks’ or ‘hosted regional cyber-drill 
exercises’. Through these they can map out what capacities the 
countries have and direct visualization of what the countries in 
question lack as regards to cyber capacities. Further these exercises 
provide an understanding of the harm and risk of having limited cyber 
capacities. However, these exercises are limited by their ability to target 
only certain aspects of a state, leaving the private sector excluded.  
Further they do not provide the countries with the ability to improve 
their situation. 
The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at Oxford 
University has taken a step towards closing the gaps between the work 
of these institutions, with the creation of the Cyber Security Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM). Though still only a pilot model, it aims to allow 
countries to self-assess their level of cyber capacity and then directly 
receive information on how to make improvements. This is done by the 
governments of the state applying information to the model, respond-
ing to direct and straightforward questions concerning their cyber 
capacities. The aim of the model is to focuses broadly, dividing its span 
of analysis into five pillars of society.6 These are (1) devising cyber 
policy and strategy (2) encouraging responsible cyber culture in society 
(3) build cyber-skills into the workforce and leadership (4) create 
effective legal and regulatory frameworks (5) control risks through 
organizations, standards and technology. Any country, independent of 
its capacity level, can use this tool. Based on their answers and on how 
they score in self-assessment, counties are classified in one of five 
levels: (1) Start-up: embryonic, (2) Formative: ‘new’, (3) Established: 
indicators are functional and defined, (4) Strategic: choices have been 
made about what to prioritize, (5) Dynamic: rapid decision- making, 
reallocation of resources and constantly changing environment. 
Depending on where a country stands according to its self-assessment, 
the GCCES tool then proposes the next steps that need to be taken to 
improve its cyber capacity. This means that instead of placing countries 
in a cluster based on what they lack, it is possible to assess what they 
have, and automatically inform them on what they need to strengthen 
and improve the situation. The more frank a country is in its self-
assessment the more will it benefit. The classification is useful as it 
allow for an assessment of countries cyber abilities and capabilities and 
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their capacity to handle cybersecurity threats. This allows for a firmer 
and targeted approach to CCB and brings us closer in being able to 
assist developing countries in their CCB. Further it allows for assi-
stance, as both the receiving and donor country know what stage the 
developing country is in, and what needs to be improved to advance 
the developing countries cyber capacity. However this model is still in 
the developmental phase. 
Implementation and the ability to provide countries with what they 
need to strengthen and improve their CCB, and how to link these 
results to donor countries, are problems that remain unresolved. Never-
theless the assessment of the work done to date in CCB shows that solid 
steps are taken towards successful assessment, mapping and compari-
son of countries cyber capacities. This allows for analysis of countries 
cyber capacities and thus of the levels of the individual countries cyber 
capacity. However implementation is still a challenge. To move the 
field forwards the next section in this report will map out some of the 
main challenges to CCB, both on the donor and recipient end. It is 
important to emphasize that all countries face different challenges in 
implementing CCB. Mapping out the challenges to CCB in a country or a 
region requires the recognition of the specificities of a given context 
(i.e. cultural, political and social heritage) and needs to ensure local 
ownership. While individual components of challenges are case 
specific, similar challenges can be found and the overall approach and 
objectives can be replicated. For instance, even though responsibilities 
can be assigned differently depending on the country in question, 
challenges often remain similar (ISSEU, 2014). As argued at the 
international conference on cyber capacity building in Paris in 2014: 
‘One size does not fit all, however one size fits most’ (ISSEU, 2014:2). 
To move CCB a head challenges need to be mapped out for capacity 
building to move towards implementation. 
 
Way ahead and challenges for CCB  
CCB is not immune to the dilemmas inherent in any type of activity 
within the donor-recipient relationship. Learning from the capacity-
building experience of other sectors is essential. Projects shaped by 
Western donors are less likely to prove sustainable. Classical dilemmas 
in the development sector related to sustainability and local ownership 
are equally relevant to CCB.7 The next section will focus on the addi-
tional challenges that arise as a result of the complex intrinsic nature of 
cyberspaces, which complicates capacity building. To simplify, these 
are divided into challenges for donor and developing countries, but in 
practice they are all interconnected and influence each other.  
Challenges for developing countries 
Developing countries face challenges in all types of activities connected 
to CCB – from human resources development, institutional reform, 
organizational adaption, and in the support provided to increase their 
access to, and ability to fully benefit from, the Internet and other ele-
ments of cyberspace. These challenges make it difficult to secure cyber-
space and the outcome of implementation.  
1. Access versus institutional stability 
Access to cyberspace is growing faster than the institutions and 
frameworks that states use to support it. This growth in access is posi-
tively received in the developing countries as it allows more people to 
connect to cyberspace and the Internet which in turn is seen as a to 
boost the economy (Burt et al. 2014a). However without institutional 
stability and legal frameworks, increased access can create more 
damage than benefits (IDG connect 2013). People become an easy 
target for cybercrime when there is no framework or institution to pre-
vent it. The challenge is to create a structure and institutional stability 
that can allow for utilization of the Internet, while simultaneously 
guarding the users against malware threats, which increase with access 
to cyberspace. To this end, critical infrastructure must be strengthened 
and efforts made to include cyberspace in existing legal frameworks. It 
is essential for the country in question to have a clear understanding of 
its own capabilities and equally of what needs to be strengthened. 
Occasions are found where countries ask for assistance in areas other 
than what should in fact be prioritized for sustainable cyber capacity. 
                                                             
7  The idea of ‘local ownership’ was established as a principle in 1996 by the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). In what is often regarded as a seminal report DAC stated: 
‘the most important contributions for development, as in the past, will be made by 
the people and governments of the developing countries themselves’ (DAC, 1996). 
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For example, a county may ask for assistance to build a CERT – but 
without having the capacity, or knowledge, to uphold one. The chal-
lenge is for developing countries to obtain a clear overview of what 
institutional and structural capacities they have, and that they have an 
understanding of what they need in order to achieve and improve their 
cyber capacity. Equally important is sharing this information with the 
aiding country or organization, to allow for efficient and sustainable 
institution and structure building.  
2. Legal framework 
An adequate legislative framework that can enact decisions for 
building a secure cyberspace is essential. Regional institutions like the 
AU and EU argue for a legislative framework as the backbone of cyber-
security and emphasized the need for a solid regulatory framework 
(Council of Europe, 2013). A functioning legal framework makes it pos-
sible to regulate governance, punish crimes, and control implementa-
tion in cyberspace. Including cyberspace in a legislative framework is 
however a challenge – not least as regards to deciding the size and 
amount of regulations to include and how broad a framework to aim at. 
This is seen in the contested debate around the new convention of the 
African Union (AU) on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection that 
requires African states to ‘establish appropriate institutions to combat 
cybercrime’ and to offer training to those stakeholders tasked with 
fighting cybercrime’ (AU Convention, EX.CL/846 XXV: 30). This is to be 
built into all aspects aimed at improving the legal and judicial aspects 
of cybercrime and security. However, concern has been voiced in that it 
is overly ambitious and too cumbersome. It has been questioned 
whether the convention asks too much of the AU member countries 
(Tamarkin, 2015). On the other hand, this new convention can 
function as a guideline and goal, as something for the AU members to 
aim for and support, instead of undervaluing it and putting it aside. 
True, a legal framework that reaches too broadly and is too ambitious is 
difficult to uphold; however, a framework that does not include enough 
is no solution either. The challenge is thus to strike a balance between 
these two.  
3. Affordability 
Many countries lack resources to build what they need to construct and 
secure capacities in cyberspace. Implementing frameworks and infra-
structure is of limited use if the receiving country does not have the 
capacity to maintain it. According to the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), African governments demonstrate an increased aware-
ness of cybersecurity issues, but existing capacity for deterring cyber-
crime and monitoring or pursuing cybersecurity has been ineffective 
(IDG connect 2013). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) is charged with developing and implementing a capacity-
building project that works to close gaps in AU expertise and training. 
The main challenge has been lack of funding for the work (Caladro et al 
2013). It is thus imperative to create frameworks and infrastructure 
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that a developing country can maintain. Training local personnel in 
maintenance of the framework and infrastructure implemented by CCB 
is a step in the right direction. This gives the country in question 
independence, to  generate and uphold its own systems.  
4. Building knowledge, understanding and awareness  
Education about the threats and risks that come with cyberspace is 
essential in today’s world of escalating use of cyberspace through 
increased access. Without awareness and education the effort to secure 
a system is rendered inefficient if not useless (Tamarkin, 2015).  Inade-
quate understanding of the importance of cybersecurity and cyber 
hygiene, as in the steps that computer users can take to improve their 
cybersecurity and better protect themselves online, is a major threat to 
CCB. This is a widespread problem for all levels society in many deve-
loping countries – from the general population and grassroots to 
government (UNODC 2013).  Training should be provided both ‘verti-
cally’ and ‘horizontally’ across government departments, the involved 
private actors and civil society (ISSEU 2013). The challenge is how to 
spread information and understanding of cyber hygiene. Awareness 
building is difficult if cybersecurity is not a government priority. A 
comprehensive understanding of the security and technological 
challenges is needed within governments. Otherwise, implementation 
of cyber security becomes difficult. Otherwise, implementation of 
cybersecurity becomes difficult. This lack of understanding and know-
ledge may also create conflicts of interest within governments. When 
only some sections in various government ministries and agencies 
recognize the importance of cybersecurity, implementation becomes 
difficult and slow. People become frustrated at the cumbersome proces-
ses of moving legislation ahead. Further complications for CCB arise in 
the number of stakeholders that need to be engaged in both the public 
and private sphere. A challenge is the need to be proactive in risk 
management, and at the same time conveying an understanding of the 
overall purpose that the security measures are intended to serve. Lack 
of understanding and knowledge on how to improve cyber capacity 
limits its further development.  
5. Public-private cooperation 
The private sector owns much of what constitutes the Internet, from 
routers to infrastructure and technology companies. The need to 
strengthen cooperation between the public and private sector in order 
to obtain a strong cybersecurity is widely argued for (UNIDIR, 2013; 
UNDESA, 2011; Calandro et al. 2013). Such a public private partner-
ship models needs to be created in the country building its cyber capa-
cities as the private industry owns much of the ICT infrastructure and is 
most active in the development of new technologies (EUISS 2013). 
However a second challenge in this debate is one seldom mention; that 
of the small and medium size private business in developing countries 
that also largely depend on cyber technologies, in the form of 
computers and internet. These businesses tended to show low interest 
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in implementing and investing in cybersecurity. The issue here is a 
twofold. Firstly there are the firms who sell ‘cybersecurity’ in the form 
of software to these companies that the buyers do not understand. 
Without an understanding of how to use such software, its effect 
becomes limited. And secondly, there are businesses owners that 
acquire software that they know do not uphold recognized standards 
(as pirated software), in order to avoid legal penalties. This software 
does not provide the security they need– but it keeps them ‘safe’ from 
the legislation that requires businesses to have software to protect their 
computers. Both these challenges result in a less secure Internet, 
locally as well as globally. Given that security is often a poor cousin to 
functionality (especially for private-sector owner/operators) some 
responses taken by firms –in whose hands the majority of technical 
infrastructure is to be found – are clearly inadequate. The challenge 
here is to get these private sector actors to understand the costs of not 
securing their cyber-systems. A lack of analytical background for main-
streaming ICT into specific development areas makes implementation 
and creation of awareness difficult. Education and information sharing 
is essential for securing cyberspace. 
Challenges for assisting nations 
The challenges in securing cyberspace in developing countries are 
found not only in the countries receiving assistance, but on the donor 
side as well. These need to be mapped out and taken into consideration 
for a successful CCB. By assessing the challenges on the donor side in 
CCB we move the debate one step closer to implementation.  
1. Data 
To assist in the implementation of and to improve another country’s 
cyber capacities, a donor country relies on the ability to obtain correct 
and informed data of the current situation in the country in question. 
However, collecting and creating such data is challenging, and large 
datasets are both hard to work with and unreliable. Because of the 
security challenges involved, the amount of information the hosting 
country is willing to share will vary. The countries in question do not 
always want to share nor do they always know exactly what capacities 
they have, or need. This in turn affects their ability to judge what cap-
abilities are most essential for them to build.  Thus what they choose to 
present and ask for in assistance is not always what it is they really 
have, or require. A challenge here is to obtain correct information, so as 
to be able to assess what aspect of CCB should have top priority. A 
second challenge is to ‘convince’ countries of what they do need, based 
on the information they share, without imposing ‘Western concepts’.  
2. Locating partners 
For CCB to be successful, partners on the donor side must work with 
partners on the receiving end. These partners need to both understand 
the importance of CCB and have influence at high levels of government. 
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However, it is not always easy to locate these partners, or get cyber-
security and capacity building placed on the agenda. If the assisting 
country is to work through development aid it needs to work with the 
government of the country it is assisting. However the public sector is 
found to lack a thorough understanding of the importance of cyber-
security and capacity building, so other developmental projects are 
given priority over CCB. Further, issues of trust and security measures 
are involved when the donor country receives limited information 
about capacities in the recipient country. This impedes good coopera-
tion between the potential partners. The private sector is essential in 
securing cyberspace, however donor countries need to work through 
the government of the country it is assisting through development aid. 
This is challenging as it is up to the developing country to build good 
relations with the private sector in its country, a matter that is not 
always in place. More time and attention need to be focused on locating 
the right partners and creating awareness of the importance of CCB. 
Here, willingness as well as political stability within the receiving 
country is essential.  
3. Training 
Training of key stakeholders in developing countries and providing 
them with the capacities they need to uphold cybersecurity is impor-
tant for a stable cyber capacity. Without the knowledge and ability to 
maintain cybersecurity, a developing country’s cyber capacity is 
limited. Education is needed, in the form of awareness creation and 
technical education in the field of cyberspace and security. This can 
provide recipient countries with the capacities they need to secure 
cyberspace and the related infrastructure. Without this knowledge they 
risk becoming dependent on donor countries to uphold their own cyber 
capacities – an unenviable situation. It is vital that recipient countries 
receive the training needed to be able to control and upkeep the capaci-
ties built through CCB programs. However, one challenge raised in 
some cyber security forums concerns being able to know that the know-
ledge shared in high-quality cybersecurity training courses is used to 
protect the country in question and not to attack others. When donor 
countries share their knowledge and ability to protect their systems, 
with the aim of allowing other countries to do the same and build func-
tional CERTs to fend off cyber-attacks, they also give the knowledge of 
how to attack the systems of other countries. This is a recognized 
dilemma encountered in connection with training police and military 
in developing countries in peace and stabilization operations. The chal-
lenge here is to come to an understanding on how to educate and give 
training in cyber capacity and security. Having a clearly defined and 
unifying objective can remove many obstacles and provide the 
premises for more efficient cooperation. One should focus first on creat-
ing awareness and understanding of the problems that come with 
cyberspace in all its forms, in all the levels and branches of the state,  
before giving technical training. Training is essential, but it requires a 
critical awareness.  
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4. Communication and cooperation 
Clear and frank communication and cooperation among all partners 
involved in CCB is essential. Donor countries need to communicate 
amongst themselves and with other organizations that are developing 
CCB analysis and tools. Equally, good communication with the recipi-
ent countries must be established, to ensure that appropriate assi-
stance goes to the countries that need it. The rapid development of 
cyberspace and the lack of communication channels among donors 
and between donors and recipient countries encumber this process. 
Poor communication channels between the actors involved may result 
in overlapping and duplication of work. Locating countries and organi-
zations that work with developing CCB on the same topic is a consistent 
challenge. Few forums exist for such communication; and the rapid 
development and growth of the field make it difficult to keep track of 
the myriad of actors. The newness of the field, combined with its rapid 
development and the state security aspects, obstructs openness and a 
culture of sharing. This affects the development of the field on both 
ends. The developing countries receive conflicting messages and 
uncorrelated aid from a range of different donor countries, creating 
confusion and hindering the development of cyber capacities. Poor 
communication among donors affects the outcome and success rate of 
CCB in the whole. With differing focus areas and solutions to the 
problem, resources are not put to best use. 
Conclusions 
This report has collected and assessed work conducted to date on CCB, 
to examine its feasibility and usefulness in bringing CCB ahead towards 
successful implementation.  Our assessment shows that a holistic 
model is needed. The focus cannot be solely on one area, but must 
include all areas of society: the judicial, social, economic, 
governmental and educational sectors. Current models and 
assessments of CCB are successful in evaluating national levels of CCB 
in individual countries, however the ability to aid countries in how to 
improve their cyber capacities is still lacking. The Oxford GSCSSs pilot 
model arguably takes a step in the right direction as it allows for full 
assessment of a country’s capacity, while remaining flexible and able 
to provide direct responses on how to improve these capacities. 
Classification is important, but the ability to improve is equally so. This 
makes possible a firmer, more targeted approach to CCB and allows for 
assistance, as both the receiving and donor country can know what 
stage the developing country is in, and thus what needs to be 
improved.  
Developing countries will need to deal with challenges in all types of 
activities connected to CCB – from human resource development, 
institutional reform, organizational adaptions, to the support provided 
to increase their access to, and ability to benefit fully from, the Internet 
and other elements of cyberspace. Mapping out the challenges takes CCB 
one-step ahead towards finding solutions. The challenges are important to 
discuss and keep in mind when considering the importance of CCB in 
development aid. It is important to emphasize that all countries face 
different challenges in implementing CCB. Mapping out the challenges 
to CCB in a country or a region requires the recognition of the 
specificities of a given context (i.e. cultural, political and social 
heritage) and needs to ensure local ownership. However while 
individual components of challenges are case specific, similar 
challenges can be found and the overall approach and objectives can 
be replicated.  This report has mapped out some off the general 
challenges that all countries face, albeit in different degrees. 
The lack of an analytical background for mainstreaming ICT into 
specific development areas makes implementation difficult. Awareness 
creation through education and information sharing is vital for a good 
cyber hygiene and sustainable cyber capacity.  This is important both 
in the private and public sector, from the grassroots to the top 
echelons. In the state system all departments and sectors need to be 
better informed. The ability to communicate this information is a 
central factor. Educators, means and funds are needed to achieve this 
goal. Education, learning, sharing and cooperation are central to 
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success. Being able to locate the right partners to create awareness of 
the importance, willingness and political stability is a key factor in 
building cyber capacities. Further cybersecurity and laws against 
cybercrime must be included in the existing legal framework. The 
challenge is to create a critical infrastructure and institutional stability 
as early as possible and to integrate this into the local system, to allow 
maximal utilization of the Internet and secure its users against 
malware. These elements in place allows for utilization of the Internet 
with a lower risk of danger of malware and similar threats.   
The investment in securing cyberspace is crucial, as it affects the 
success rate of other policy initiatives as well. Assistance is essential to 
developing countries that are expanding their access, their capacity to 
use cyberspace and their overall development and security. Given the 
speed of technological progress, it is important to think of capacity 
building as a dynamic process where the needs of stakeholders are in 
constant evolution. Mainstreaming various structural and cyber 
specific ‘add-ons’ into different policies may promote the development 
of policies that are more resilient to all types of risks (Calandro and 
Pawlak 2014). By assisting in building cyber capacities, donor 
countries contribute to creating a safe and stable cyberspace. CCB is 
about more than just securing and utilising cyberspace: successful 
implementation can help to provide broader stability and socio-
economic growth. A focus on private-public cooperation, education, 
governance, policy and national strategy in CCB is recommended. This 
report has taken a first step towards implementation of CCB by 
mapping out the challenges for the road ahead. What is needed next is 
a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and recommendations for 
advancing CCB. 
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